Collection of info on risks to locations, entities, and events.
Coming soon – Info papers on security of religious or faith based entities, schools, and shopping centers/malls.
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
“ROOFTOP” SECURITY and DISPLACEMENT
2 JULY 2020
Fifty-two years ago on August 1, 1966, Charles Whitman climbed to the top of the University of Texas Tower observation deck with three rifles, two pistols, and a sawed-off shotgun where he shot 43 people and killed thirteen. From an elevated tactical position, former Marine Whitman introduced the nation to the idea of mass murder in a public space: With this knowledge everyone should be concerned about elevated locations that can provide a potential violent individual an unobstructed view of a possible target area. On July 7, 2016, in Dallas and last October 2017 we were again reminded when mass shootings came from a high vantage point that concealed the shooters’ location from law enforcement, delayed emergency response times, and caused confusion as to the direction of the threat. This product will examine “rooftops” as ultimate elevated position.
In Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War”, military leaders are advised to take high ground and let the enemy try to attack from a lower position. Attacks from an elevated position can provide a potential violent individual an unobstructed view of a possible target area. During an attack, a higher vantage point could be used to conceal an actor’s location from law enforcement, delay emergency response times, and cause confusion as to the direction of the threat. This makes the current training of what to do in an active-shooter situation, i.e., “run, hide, fight” less effective since it is difficult to determine from where the shots may be coming. Also victims on the ground are not afforded access to adequate cover due to the shooter’s elevated position and vantage points.
Hollywood has given a really screwed up misconception of snipers. Snipers do not sit with their guns hanging out of a window and a long range shot is not one block or two blocks, it’s about 8 or 9 blocks or 600 to 900 yards. If a shooter is up high from a window or rooftop they can see down the street they do not have to hang over a window sill or the edge of the rooftop to see those distances down a street. Snipers want to see and not be seen, so they can kill and not be killed. Rooftops are the ultimate elevated perch for shooters. Rooftops can provide concealment for a shooter and an unobstructed view of a target area while delaying emergency response times, cause confusion on the direction of the threat, and limit areas of cover.
Fifty-two years ago on August 1, 1966, Charles Whitman climbed to the top of the University of Texas Tower observation deck with three rifles, two pistols, and a sawed-off shotgun where he shot 43 people and killed thirteen. From an elevated tactical position, former Marine Whitman introduced the nation to the idea of mass murder in a public space: With this knowledge everyone should be concerned about elevated locations that can provide a potential violent individual an unobstructed view of a possible target area. On July 7, 2016, in Dallas and October 2017 we were again reminded when mass shootings came from a high vantage point that concealed the shooters’ location from law enforcement, delayed emergency response times, and caused confusion as to the direction of the threat.
The shootings in Dallas and Las Vegas are prime examples from an elevated vantage points beyond the immediate security perimeter. The need for peripheral awareness is important to the security effort and the entire perimeter, including “rooftops” and areas that require access control must be defined. The goals of any perimeter patrol or reconnaissance is to provide early warnings, report suspicious activities, identifying any possible adversarial observations, and gathering information on any suspicious person in the area. Overwatch, strategic, tactical, and operational planning and preparation is critical to prevention.
In the planning effort the Circles of Prevention were developed from previous incident intelligence and information and strategic and tactical suggestions from personal defense theory. The Circles consists of Areas Physical Security Systems, i.e., Interior – intrusion alarms, panic/duress alarms, video surveillance; Building Perimeter – access control, video surveillance, lighting; Venue Perimeter – fence or other boundary, video surveillance, lighting; and Outer Perimeter – reference points of visible locations within the maximum effective range of possible weapons or explosives and includes all security displacement areas.
Particularly the Outer Perimeters that extend to the maximum effective range of possible weapons include locations that provide concealment and/or cover to an attacker. Elevated positions, especially “rooftops,” are extremely important and securing of “rooftops” should be included in all preplanning. Rooftopping has been a type of “urban exploration” hobby for individuals seeking illicit access or examination of normally unseen or off-limit areas of critical infrastructure. Some perform death-defying acts where people hang off the edge of rooftops or perform gymnastic feats or other stunts for a more shocking photograph. It is particularly concerning to security because it often encompasses criminal trespassing and other acts prohibited by facility owners and operators for safety, security, liability, and other reasons.
The shootings in Dallas and Las Vegas are prime examples from an elevated vantage points beyond the immediate security perimeter. The need for peripheral awareness is important to the security effort and the entire perimeter, including “rooftops” and areas that require access control must be defined. The goals of any perimeter patrol or reconnaissance is to provide early warnings, report suspicious activities, identifying any possible adversarial observations, and gathering information on any suspicious person in the area. Overwatch, strategic, tactical, and operational planning and preparation is critical to prevention. In the planning effort the Circles of Prevention were developed from previous incident intelligence and information and strategic and tactical suggestions from personal defense theory. The Circles consists of Areas Physical Security Systems, i.e., Interior – intrusion alarms, panic/duress alarms, video surveillance; Building Perimeter – access control, video surveillance, lighting; Venue Perimeter – fence or other boundary, video surveillance, lighting; and Outer Perimeter – reference points of visible locations within the maximum effective range of possible weapons or explosives and includes all security displacement areas.
Particularly the Outer Perimeters that extend to the maximum effective range of possible weapons include locations that provide concealment and/or cover to an attacker. Elevated positions, especially “rooftops,” are extremely important and securing of “rooftops” should be included in all preplanning. Rooftopping has been a type of “urban exploration” hobby for individuals seeking illicit access or examination of normally unseen or off-limit areas of critical infrastructure. Some perform death-defying acts where people hang off the edge of rooftops or perform gymnastic feats or other stunts for a more shocking photograph. It is particularly concerning to security because it often encompasses criminal trespassing and other acts prohibited by facility owners and operators for safety, security, liability, and other reasons (e.g., disobeying “Do Not Enter” or “Hardhat Required” signs).
In all cases, trespassers seek to exploit open security vulnerabilities as corporations, particularly those in the hotel and resort industry seek to strike a balance between ensuring appropriate security measures to protect people and property, as well as providing friendly and caring customer service. Some of the tactics used by individuals attempting to gain access to “rooftops” and other restricted areas are:
Social Engineering – Use of deception to manipulate individuals into providing access to a location or divulging confidential information, such as the names of employees, security procedures, or site vulnerabilities. Information provided could also be used to enhance an individual’s credibility to gain access to a location or explain the presence if challenged by security or law enforcement.
Tailgating – Following an employee with access privileges into a restricted area. This is most likely to occur in resorts that allow employee access to the rooftops for breaks.
Breaking and Entering – Criminal act of entering an enclosed area through the slightest amount of force even access to a rooftop by merely pushing a door open without authorization. Properties that use the rooftop as an emergency exit are particularly susceptible to this tactic, as fire codes may prohibit properties from locking emergency exit doors.
Unauthorized Access – Entering a restricted area from an adjacent public space. In this case, there may also be little or no security warnings (e.g., “Restricted Access”, “Do Not Enter”, or “Employees Only” signs) in place to prevent unauthorized access from the public area.
Pretexting – The creation of a plausible but fabricated scenario explaining why an individual is in a restricted area if he or she is intercepted by security or law enforcement. This may also involve impersonating an employee or a contractor who requires access to a restricted area, or the use of uniforms, clothing, or badges resembling those worn by facility personnel.
Testing or Probing of Security – Deliberately interacting with or challenging security in order to test the strengths and vulnerabilities of security systems and personnel at a site by engaging in overtly suspicious actions to provoke and observe responses by security or law enforcement officers.
Online Surveillance – Leveraging publicly available information on the internet to gain insight on a potential target to support pre-operational planning efforts. This includes the use of internet search engines for various kinds of information (e.g., maps, company photographs, or logos) and social media sites and blogs for additional details about a facility’s layout or security procedures.
The”rooftopping” tactics used to access rooftops must be understood in order to prevent access in an events outer perimeter. Methods to enter the “rooftops” vary depending on the individual and the particular facility, but any of these tactics can enable an individual(s) with violent intent to conduct an elevated attack targeting mass gatherings using similar means.
In review, “Rooftops” are the ultimate elevated positions. High vantage points conceal the shooters’ location from law enforcement, delays response, causes confusion as to the direction of the threat, and limits protection for targeted individuals. In planning employ the concept of the Circles of Prevention. The Circles consists of Areas Physical Security Systems, i.e., Interior, Building Perimeter, Venue Perimeter, and Outer Perimeter. Outer Perimeters include elevated locations that provide concealment and/or cover to an attacker and securing of “rooftops” is important. Tactics used to access “rooftops” must be understood in order to prevent access in an events outer perimeter. Methods to enter the “rooftops” vary depending on the individual and the particular facility, but similar means can enable an individual(s) with violent intent to conduct an elevated attack targeting mass gatherings.
DISPLACEMENT OF VULNERABILITIES
Crime displacement is the relocation of crime from one place, time, target, offense, or tactic to another as a result of some crime prevention initiative. Spatial displacement is by far the most commonly recognized form, though the other four are also frequently acknowledged by those studying crime prevention effects. Formally, the possible forms of displacement are:
• Temporal – offenders change the time at which they commit crime;
• Spatial – offenders switch from targets in one location to targets in another location;
• Target – offenders change from one type of target to another;
• Tactical – offenders alter the methods used to carry out crime; and
• Offense – offenders switch from one form of crime to another.
“Displacement” in security is commonly referred to when increased security and expanded perimeters create new bottlenecks where crowds wait to clear security. Despite increased protective deployments, entry control measures, and expanded perimeters around areas with a large security presence, law enforcement and security personnel remain vulnerable at the security perimeter. Attackers, understanding where the security perimeter begins, strike just outside where congestion creates predictable crowds and security is less extensive. Recent examples are the attacks on a police officer on duty just outside the TSA checkpoint in Flint, Michigan, bombing on the Ariana Grande concert where the egress corridor was crowded, and shooting in Las Vegas from an elevated vantage point beyond the immediate security perimeter.
Even though displacement is viewed as a negative consequence of crime prevention efforts, in some cases it can still provide some benefit. Current thinking suggests that beneficial displacement can occur when the harm produced by the displaced crime is less than what existed before the intervention. When considering how best to manage risks, less visible security outside of a perimeter and efforts to moderate crowd size may prove effective in mitigating the risk to both civilians and security personnel. In any event, the need for peripheral awareness is important to the security effort as a whole and to the individual officers.
As always suspicious activity reports (SAR) from LE, Security, event employees, employees of surrounding entities, and attendees are key to prevention efforts. More than 95% of thwarted terror attacks in the past two years have been the result on someone reporting something suspicious. Terrorists may attempt to breach secured perimeters or gain unauthorized access to facilities, sensitive locations, or restricted areas for preoperational activity or to conduct an attack. Attempts at intrusion could take the form of trespassing, forced entry or impersonation of authorized personnel and could possibly involve the assistance of knowledgeable “insiders.” While many of the activities may be harmless by themselves, they demonstrate potential vulnerabilities common to protecting people and infrastructure. The need for vigilance and preparation on the part of all public and private sector partners in identifying indicators of a potential terrorist attack is extremely important.